



At their meeting in Copenhagen in December
2002 the EU heads of state decided to accept ten
new countries as members of the European Union
(EU) in May 2004. This enlargement is  a very
significant event in the history of the EU.The num-
ber of accession countries is large,as ten new mem-
bers will join (the Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). The
earlier enlargements in 1995 and in 1981–86
involved only three countries each. The 2004
enlargement will raise the EU population to about
480 million people from the current 375 million in
the EU-15 countries.
The 2004 enlargement will have major economic
implications, and this chapter aims to provide a
primer on key economic issues, including economic
growth, the public sector, labour markets and social
policies, as well as factor mobility and sectoral
changes. Our discussion will review what different
studies say about economic consequences of the
enlargement.
The expansion of the EU has created, on the one
hand, high hopes for fast economic growth and
rising living standards among the new members
and,on the other,has led to worries about the loss
of jobs and higher unemployment in the EU-15
countries.Two simple indicators about differences
in living standards and labour costs between
EU-15 and new member states serve to illus-
trate the emerging economic pressures. These
differences imply major challenges to economic
policies.
Data on PPP-adjusted GDP per capita as a measure
of living standards in Table 5.1 indicate that many of
the new member countries are poor in comparison
to the existing members. Latvia has currently the
lowest GDP per capita among the accession coun-
tries (the ratio to the EMU average is 32.3 percent)
while Cyprus has the highest GDP per capita (the
ratio to the EMU average is 88.5 percent). The big
differences in living standards can, for example, trig-
ger significant migration from new members to EU-
15 countries. Speeding up economic growth in the
accession countries is obviously a major policy
objective.
As a second indicator of economic policy issues we
briefly look at labour costs among the accession
and present EU countries, measured at going
exchange rates. Table 5.2 shows that hourly labour
costs in the new member countries are only a small
fraction of the corresponding costs in the present
EU countries.1 The wage gap is particularly large
for those present EU countries that happen to
neighbour on the accession countries, such as
Austria, Finland, Sweden and, in particular,
Germany. In West Germany, the hourly labour cost
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Note: PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted
to international dollars using purchasing power pa-
rity rates. An international dollar has the same pur-
chasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in the
United States.
Source: WDI, World Bank.
1 Data on Malta is not available.
2 IdW,“Deutschland in Zahlen”, 2002.EEAG Report 97
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The wide gap in labour costs suggests that there are
incentives for western firms to move the labour
intensive parts of their production activities to the
new member states, and in fact, there has already
been a significant movement of western firms to the
east. While the 1980s and 1990s have shown signifi-
cant outsourcing activities of big European compa-
nies to east Asia, at present an increasing outsourc-
ing activity of middle-sized and even smaller firms to
Eastern Europe can be observed. For example, in a
survey carried out by the Cologne Institute for
Business Research, about 60 percent of the German
firms with less than 5,000 employees had already
established plants outside the EU, most of them in
Eastern Europe.3
Besides growth, labour markets, and sectoral
changes, the accession to the EU will have major
implications for the public sec-
tor of the new member states.
On the one hand,the new mem-
ber countries will receive signif-
icant transfers from the EU
budget. On the other hand, they
will need to co-finance project-
based transfers and pay their
membership dues to the EU
from the beginning. Moreover,
compliance with the EU regula-
tions, the Acquis Communitaire,
will lead to additional public
expenditure. The levels of pub-
lic debt in the new member
countries are currently low, but
many of these countries have sizeable public
deficits.
2. Economic growth
Following the difficult early 1990s, many of the new
member countries have achieved relatively fast
growth in recent years (see Table 5.3). For most
accession countries, growth rates reached high levels
as early as the second half of 1990s, but in the Czech
Republic the difficulties with transition from a
socialist system appear to have lasted longer, as
growth became significantly positive only after
1999.4 Most recently, as a result of the recession in
the Western world, there has been a little bit of a
slowdown in growth in some accession countries,
whereas economic growth has continued at a largely
unchanged pace in others.5
On the whole, the new member countries have been
growing faster than most of the EU-15 countries.The
relatively high growth rates in Figure 5.1 suggest that
these countries have already been reaping some gains
from closer integration with Western Europe. EU
Eastern enlargement will trigger some further changes
in growth and welfare in the accession countries and
also small growth effects in the EU-15 countries,
though these changes have already partly been taking
place in recent years in the pre-accession process.
Table 5.2
















3 IdW,IW-Trends, Dokumentation 4,2002.
4 It should be kept in mind that GDP per capita in the former
socialist countries fell significantly in the early years of transition
from socialism, so that for several countries the level of real GDP
in 2001 was still lower than in 1989.
5 Table A.1 in the Appendix gives key economic indicators for the
new member countries.There are two basic mechanisms whereby full EU
membership contributes to improved economic
growth in the accession countries. First, traditional
trade effects of economic integration will occur
through trade creation and trade diversion, of which
the former is beneficial and the latter is harmful.
Trade creation refers to increased trade generating
new economic activity, whereas trade diversion
refers to the redirection of existing trade as a result
of changes in tariffs and other barriers due to the
regional customs union.
Increased international trade will,in principle,also
benefit current member countries, but this effect is
much less certain, at least in the short and medium
term, since it relies on the ability of the current
member countries to react quickly to the changes
in relative goods and factor prices that come with
opening trade. (Moreover, the effect on the EU-15
will be small, given that the combined GDP of the
entrants is only a small fraction of EU-15 GDP.)
As Eastern Europe is capital-poor but labour-
abundant, trade will require the relative prices of
labour-intensive goods along with real wages to
decline in the West and labour to move out of
these sectors to more capital-intensive ones. If
unions or social replacement incomes offered by
the welfare state impede the necessary wage
adjustments, unemployment may result instead of
gains from trade. Among the current members,
those bordering the entering countries will poten-
tially receive the largest benefits in the long run,
but they may also incur the largest adjustment
costs in the short run.
Second, economic growth in the new member
countries can receive a boost through movements
of factors of production and other dynamic effects
such as capital accumulation, technology transfer,
increased competition and possible economies of
scale. Movements of factors of production can lead
diverse effects on growth, as they depend on the
nature and direction of the factor movements.
These movements have already been taking place
in recent years, for example in the form of
increased foreign direct investment in the new
member countries.
Next, we shall discuss the effects on trade and
growth more closely, after which scenarios for
growth and convergence of the new member coun-
tries toward EU-15 average levels of GDP will be
presented.We note that fiscal transfers to new mem-
ber countries can also alter the picture of pure
growth effects as they represent a benefit to entrants.
The fiscal transfers are to a significant degree a con-
sequence of full membership, though some transfers
have taken place even before membership as pre-
accession aid.
2.1 Growth and trade
Changes in international trade between countries
are a major part of the effects of economic integra-
tion on GDP and welfare; see Frankel and Romer
(1999) and references therein. The fall of the Iron
Curtain led to major changes in trade. EU imports
from the Central Eastern European countries dou-
bled within the first five years of the transition from
socialism.The EU-15 countries are by far the largest
trading partner of the accession countries.For exam-
ple, in 2001 about 61 percent of exports of the new
member countries went to the EU (see Table A.1 in
the Appendix).In contrast,the share of imports from
the accession countries in total imports of the EU-15
is still relatively low, approximately 10 percent in
2001.
The trade effects of EU enlargement are likely to be
different from those in the 1990s because significant
reductions in trade barriers have already taken place
before actual enlargement. The effects of the aboli-
tion of tariffs and the reduction in trade costs
between EU-15 countries and the new member
states are likely to be small for the EU-15, amount-
ing perhaps to 0.05-0.1 percentage points cumulative
changes in levels of GDP in a five-year period,
according to Breuss (2001).This is because the enter-
ing countries are economically small in relation to
the current EU-15.
For the accession countries, the trade effects are
likely to be much bigger than for the EU-15,
amounting perhaps to 1.2 to 4.3 percentage points
of changes in GDP; see e.g. Breuss (2001) for a
study using the OEF world macroeconomic model
and for references to other studies.6The asymmetry
is explained by the fact that, as noted above, the
current EU countries are the largest trading part-
ner of the new member countries, whereas the new




6 Some estimates of the effects from trade diversion have also been
made.Overall,the effects of Eastern enlargement on the rest of the
world are small, but the effects from trade diversion can be signifi-
cant in specific sectors, notably in textiles and agriculture; see
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2.2 Estimated growth effects
Full membership is expected to accelerate economic
growth via increased foreign direct investment
(FDI), new trade within the enlarged EU, the aid
from the EU budget,and other channels.However,it
is not straightforward to disentangle the effects of
full membership from the effects of increased inte-
gration that has already taken place at the pre-mem-
bership stage.
The empirical studies considering full integration of
the accession countries into the Single Market of the
EU employ either global computational general
equilibrium models or global macroeconomic mod-
els for computing the growth effects;see e.g.Baldwin
et al. (1997), Breuss (2001), Lejour et al. (2001),
Fidrmuc et al. (2002) and the references therein.
These studies suggest that the level of GDP in the
accession countries will be significantly raised by the
2004 enlargement. For example, simulation results
from a world macroeconomic model reported in
Breuss (2001) suggest an up to 8 or 9 percent higher
GDP over a ten-year period for some accession
countries, with lower estimates for other entering
countries. These estimates of GDP effects on the
entrants translate into an increase in their growth
rates by nearly one percent per year.
Even higher estimates of the effect of EU enlarge-
ment on growth in the Central Eastern European
countries have been suggested in studies using the
methodology of growth accounting. The growth
effect might be as high as 1 to 2 percent per year;see
European Commission (2001a) and Doyle et al.
(2001).7 Possible membership of the accession coun-
tries in EMU in the longer term could stimulate
GDP per capita further through improved opportu-
nities for trade and capital movements as a result of
reduced exchange rate risks, increased competition
and lower transaction costs.8
The effect on the GDP of current members is, at
best, of the order of one tenth of the corresponding
effect on the accession countries. Moreover, there
are likely to be differences among the current mem-
ber countries.The largest benefits will be received by
countries having geographic proximity to and exten-
sive trade links with the new members.Germany and
Austria are examples of higher than average
impacts.9 However, as mentioned above, it is unclear
when such benefits will occur.The available empiri-
cal results are based on general equilibrium models
with instantaneous market clearing and flexible
wages that are unable to capture the particular diffi-
culties facing economies whose labour markets are
restricted by large welfare states and powerful
unions.By their very nature these models are unable
to foresee the transitional difficulties such eco-
nomies might have before they are able to reap text-
book gains from trade.
More generally, the growth benefits from joining the
Single Market will not be uniform across countries
and regions. There will probably be significant dif-
ferences between countries,with the Central Eastern
European countries having possibly the largest
growth benefits. In addition, experiences from the
transition period, during which there has already
been significant partial integration of Eastern
European countries into the Western world, suggest
that close-to-border regions and regions around
national capitals are likely to be the greatest benefi-
ciaries in the process of further integration.Not only
geography but also foreign direct investment and a
high level of education are apparently the keys to
regional and country success; see Tondl and Vuksic
(2003).
2.3 Growth scenarios for new member countries
The slowness of the growth and catching-up process-
es is an important point that is often forgotten in pop-
ular discussions of the benefits from the 2004
enlargement. We illustrate the long period of time
needed in the catching-up towards the EU-15 aver-
age by two simple simulations of per capita GDP lev-
els and labour costs of the new member countries.10
The computations assume that the income per capi-
ta difference between the EU-15 and the respective
acceding country will shrink by two percent every
year. This is in accordance with the estimates in
Chapters 11 and 12 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995), although the actual convergence rate was
7 More generally, panel-structured growth accounting estimates
suggest that membership in the EU has positive effects on eco-
nomic growth through closer integration and possibly institutional
change; see Crespo-Cuaresma et al (2002) for estimates and dis-
cussion.
8 The estimates of the growth effects of a common currency are
subject to disagreements due to different measurement method-
ologies; see for example Persson (2001), Rose (2000, 2001) and
Micco et al. (2003).
9 Keuschnigg et al. (2001) point out that Germany is likely to have
gains from the enlargement even after accounting for the increased
budgetary costs via contributions to the EU budget.See Fidrmuc et
al. (2002) for results on Austria.
10 See for example Sarajevs (2001) and European Commission
(2003b) for other scenarios.even lower in the period 1963 to 2000, which was
only 1.1 percent; see Sinn and Ochel (2003).
Table 5.3 gives the relative levels of per capita
income and labour cost for the years 2010, 2020 and
2030. We emphasize that the quantitative results
must be viewed with extreme caution since they are
based on strong assumptions and a mechanistic pro-
jection. Despite their limitations, the scenarios con-
vey the important lesson that catching up with EU-
15 will take several decades for most accession coun-
tries even under the optimistic assumption that EU
membership is consistent with a two percent annual
convergence rate, which is above the rate so far
observed.
Cyprus and Slovenia have the shortest catching-up
periods, but even for them it will take, respectively,
10 and 30 years to reach 90 percent of the EU-15
level of per capita GDP. Under the more realistic
present convergence rate, it would take even longer.
At the other extreme, several countries, including
Poland, and the Baltic countries, will need 10 to
20 years to reach even 50 percent of the EU per capi-
ta income level. Achievement of fast economic
growth must therefore be a major item on the eco-
nomic policy agendas of the new member countries.
3. Fiscal aspects of enlargement
3.1 Sustainability of public finances
We start by considering the public finances in the
accession countries. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the
development of public sector deficits and debt for
the period 2001–2003.
Table 5.4 indicates that interest
rates for long-term bonds have
been relatively high for most
entering countries.
It is evident that public finances
are fairly delicate for many of
the entering countries.It is antic-
ipated that problems of fiscal
balance will continue in the
future; see for instance Euro-
pean Commission (2003b) for
such forecasts.The new member
countries are in quite different
situations with respect to current
public sector balances. Some
countries face severe problems,
while public deficits are moder-
ate for other countries, with
Estonia even running a surplus.
The levels of public debt are rel-
atively low (Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
In terms of the level of public
indebtedness, the entering coun-
tries are generally in better
shape than most of the EU-15
countries.11 Only Cyprus and
Malta are above the Maastricht
limit of 60 percent and even
EEAG Report 100
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 Table 5.3 a
Convergence in per capita income (PPP)
2001 2010 2020 2030
Latvia 32.2 43.5 53.8 62.3
Lithuania 35.3 46.1 55.9 64.0
Poland 39.4 49.5 58.7 66.3
Estonia 42.4 52.0 60.8 67.9
Slovak
Republic 49.9 58.2 65.9 72.1
Hungary 51.5 59.6 66.9 73.0
Malta 54.9 62.4 69.3 74.9
Czech
Republic 61.4 67.8 73.7 78.5
Slovenia 71.5 76.2 80.6 84.1
Cyprus 88.5 90.4 92.1 93.6
EMU 100 100 100 100
Table 5.3 b
Convergence in labour cost (% of EU average)
2001 2010 2020 2030
Latvia 10.9 25.7 39.3 50.4
Lithuania 12.2 26.8 40.2 51.1
Estonia 13.6 28.0 41.1 51.9
Slovak
Republic 13.7 28.1 41.2 52.0
Hungary 17.2 31.0 43.6 53.9
Czech
Republic 17.5 31.2 43.8 54.1
Poland 20.1 33.4 45.6 55.5
Slovenia 40.4 50.3 59.4 66.8
Cyprus 48.4 56.9 64.8 71.2
EU 100 100 100 100
Note: The assumption underlying these simulations is that the difference in the
levels of per capita income and labour cost will shrink by two percent every year.
   Source:  World Bank, WDI, Cologne Institute for Business Research and own
   calculations.
11 See also Chapter 2 of the 2003 EEAG
report for data and discussion of public
debts and deficits of the EU-15 countries
as well as of the accession countries.EEAG Report 101
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their debts are not very far above the limit.The cur-
rently low levels of public debt are,however,not that
convincing as several entering countries are running
large public sector deficits, though there are also
countries with a much better fiscal situation
(Figures 5.2 and 5.3). The highest forecasted figures
for 2003 are 8.0 and 7.6 percent deficits in the Czech
Republic and Malta, respectively. Moreover, the
entering countries will greatly need to increase their
public spending, e.g. to improve their public infra-
structure.
On the whole, the accession
countries have not been success-
ful in improving their public
finances. In the period 2000 to
2002 the deficit levels have been
constant or slightly increasing
for many of the entrants as a
result of the economic slow-
down, though a few countries,
notably the Baltic countries,
have succeeded in improving
their public sector balances
despite the slowdown. The
European Commission (2003b)
forecasts that public sector
deficits will continue to be a
problem in coming years for sev-
eral of the new member coun-
tries. Unless public sector
deficits are brought under con-
trol, the sustainability of public
debt can become a major prob-
lem for some of the new member
states in the longer term.
3.2 Enlargement and the 
EU budget 
The EU-15 member countries
have to finance the additional
expenditures in the EU budget
that are not covered by the con-
tributions of the new members.
The latter contributions will,
however, be small in the aggre-
gate, though not so small in
terms of the GDPs of the
entrants, which is of the order of
1.2 percent of their GDP; see
Backe (2002) and Richter
(2003b).
The burden of the enlargement on the EU budget
for the EU-15 members has been estimated to be
small, perhaps of the order of 0.2 percent of GDP,
though for the southern European countries the
costs (relative to GDP) are likely to be higher due to
a reformulation of the structural funds programme;
see Breuss (2001).
After enlargement, over 14 percent of the EU bud-
get will go to the ten accession countries..Table A.2
Figure 5.2
 Table 5.4
Long-term interest rates in percent
2000 2001 2002
Czech Republic 6.9 6.3 4.6
Cyprus 7.6 7.7 5.4
Estonia 3.8 4.0 2.7
Hungary 8.6 7.9 7.1
Latvia 7.8 7.5 5.3
Lithuania 11.5 7.3 6.0
Malta 5.8 6.1 5.7
Poland 11.8 10.7 7.3
Slovak Republic 8.3 8.1 6.9
Slovenia 4.7 4.6 3.4
Euro area 5.4 5.0 4.9
Note: long-term or medium-term government bonds. Estonia: Commercial bank
deposit rates; EU: weighted average using GDP; Euro area: From January 1999,
weighted by the nominal stock of government bonds.
   Source: Eurostat,”Money, Finance and the Euro,” European Commission, Luxembourg.in the Appendix provides the data on the amounts of
the EU budget that are appropriated to the new
member countries for the years 2004 to 2006.(In EU
jargon “appropriations for commitments” refer to
maximal allocations in the EU budget. The ex post
amounts will usually be smaller than the appropria-
tions since, for example, some of the items require a
project.) The appropriated amounts for the new
member countries range from 6.9 to 1.7 percent of
the GDP of each recipient country.Table A.3 shows
the appropriations to the new members as part of
the EU budget, expressed as fractions of the total
EU budget.
3.3 Effects on the new member countries
The new members will be recipients of significant
funds from the EU budget,as indicated by Table A.2
in the Appendix.Total receipts as a percentage of the
GDP of recipient countries vary inversely with the
level of GDP. Structural assistance to public infra-
structure, transport, the business sector and educa-
tion are a major item in the EU support, with, for
example, Latvia receiving 4.4 percent of its GDP as
support for structural actions.
Agriculture is another major
item of support from the EU
budget to the new member
countries: entering countries
will receive from 1.7 percent
(Lithuania) to 0.3 percent
(Cyprus and Malta) of their
GDP as support for agriculture.
We will discuss agriculture fur-
ther in Section 5.
Several further considerations
are pertinent in assessing the
data in Tables A.2 and A.3.First,
a significant part of the appro-
priations will be project-related,
and it is probable that some pro-
jects will not go through. Thus,
in reality net transfers are going
to be smaller than the appropri-
ations, though precise estimates
are not easy to obtain. By mak-
ing specific assumptions about
“success rates,” Richter (2003b)
estimates that the actual trans-
fers might be around 60 percent
of the appropriations. He sug-
gests that the net transfers from
the EU to the new member states might be just a lit-
tle over one third of the gross figures in Tables A.2
and A.3.
Second, the entering countries will have to co-
finance the EU-funded structural operations to a sig-
nificant extent.This will be a burden on government
budgets in these countries unless there is substitu-
tion between the co-financing and existing national
public spending. On the other hand, the additional
infrastructure investments are likely to stimulate
growth in the entering countries. Estimates of these
two effects vary a great deal. Moreover, differences
in opinion exist about the adequacy of public infra-
structure in terms of both quantity and quality (see
Funck 2002 and Backe 2002 for further discussions).
The reform of public administration and acquis
implementation is another source of costs and bene-
fits to the government budgets in the entering coun-
tries.12 In particular, the costs of environmental pro-
EEAG Report 102
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costs and benefits. Young and Wallace (2000) assess the enlarge-
ment and the politics of EU regulatory policies.
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tection have been viewed as a major expenditure
item. The European Commission (2001b) provides
information on the relevant aspects of environmen-
tal financing and the state of the environmental
infrastructure in the accession countries.A variety of
estimates have been made of the budgetary implica-
tions in adopting EU environmental regulations,
with the initial high estimates becoming more mod-
erate in recent times. In individual cases the costs of
regulatory compliance can be high. An example is
Estonia, for which the annual compliance costs have
been estimated to be of the order of 4 to 5 percent of
GDP, mostly resulting from meeting environmental
regulations. This estimate for Estonia is in marked
contrast to general estimates that are in the range of
0.5 to 1.9 percent; see Backe (2002). Transport is
another item of public infrastructure,13 for which the
compliance costs are likely to be significant; see
Kopits and Szekely (2002) and Funck (2002).
The recent Comprehensive Monitoring Report by
the European Commission (2003c) points out
numerous difficulties in the progress towards imple-
menting EU regulations in the new member coun-
tries. The failures of fulfilment can even risk reduc-
tions in EU aid to some entering countries.Another
concern is the continued existence of corruption in
several entering countries even if progress has been
made in reducing it; see European Commission
(2003c) for further discussion.
Additional budgetary costs or savings to the entering
countries arise from realignment of customs duties, tax
harmonization and phasing out of production subsidies.
Most entering countries have higher customs duties
than EU-15 members and the loss in this revenue item
can be up to 0.5 percent of GDP for some entering
countries. However, for Estonia there is an estimated
revenue increase of the order of 0.2 percent of GDP,
since customs duties there will have to be raised after
EU entry. With respect to tax harmonization it is esti-
mated that there will be a small positive revenue effect,
perhaps 0.5 percent of GDP of the new member states.
Similarly, the elimination of production subsidies will
have a positive budgetary effect, as they will be phased
out gradually. A case in point is the banking sector.
Some of the accession countries are still struggling with
reducing the subsidies to the banking system that are a
legacy of the banking crises in the early years of transi-
tion (see Backe 2002, Römisch 2003, Funck 2002, and
Kopits and Szekely 2002 for further discussion).
3.4 Further indirect effects
The 2004 enlargement will induce indirect effects on
the economies of the entering countries,which will in
turn have implications for the government budgets.
As discussed in Section 2, full EU membership is
likely to stimulate economic growth in the entering
countries.The projected increases in growth will lead
to some improvements in the government budgetary
balances of these countries. The magnitude of these
budget effects depends on the size of the positive
growth effect.The budgetary improvement could be
significant, of the order of 0.4 percent of GDP; see
Backe (2002).
In addition to growth effects, structural reforms as a
result of EU membership can yield some improve-
ments in government budgetary balances, but these
effects are difficult to separate from the growth
effects. EU membership will also bring benefits in
the form of reduced interest rate risk premia and
increased FDI, though these have to some extent
been anticipated before the entry itself. Finally, with
EU membership, the entering ten countries will face
some tax competition, for example in the taxation of
capital.This can, in principle, exert a negative effect
on their government budgets.However,since the rel-
evant effective taxes in the entering countries are
usually lower than in the current EU-15 members,
the downward pressure on the tax rates of the
entrants is likely to be small if not non-existent.
The following table summarizes the estimated medi-
um-term fiscal effects of EU membership on the
entering countries; the estimates are from Backe
(2002).
Table 5.5 suggests that the fiscal effects from EU
membership are likely to be somewhat positive in
the medium term. In the short run, there will most
likely be fiscal strains on the entering countries, as
the positive indirect effects will emerge only gradu-
ally. Moreover, the magnitude of the indirect effects
will depend on the size of the positive growth effects
of EU membership.
3.5 Other pressures in the public sector
Recent data on the new member countries indicate
that, on the whole, the countries have not cut their
public expenditures. In addition to expenditure
needs that arise from joining the EU, the new mem-
ber states will need to reform the structure of their
13 For example, road improvement for heavy trucks will need to be
done.public finances to achieve rapid growth. In compari-
son to the EU-15 countries, the entering countries
have relatively high rates of consumption taxes, sim-
ilar levels of labour taxation and relatively low taxes
on capital and corporations; see Römisch (2003) for
a description and estimates of statutory and average
effective rates.
Pension reforms have been undertaken in some but
not all of these countries. In particular, the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia have
not undertaken major reforms and are facing sus-
tainability pressures, whereas concerns about the
sustainability of the pension system are gradually
subsiding in other countries (Estonia, Latvia,
Hungary and Poland); see Funck (2002, 71–83) for a
detailed discussion.
A more universal issue is the need for reform of the
education systems in the accession countries. School
age populations and to some extent school enrolment
in the accession countries
(excluding Cyprus and Malta)
have fallen and are projected to
fall further. Performance in
terms of recent international
comparisons does not seem to be
very good. For example, the
PISA results for some accession
countries were below the OECD
average in 2000 and there is some
evidence of a fall in the test
scores over time; see Funck
(2002, 37–39) for a discussion of
the indicators. Improving the
ability of the education system to
match the changing structure of
skill needs is a central element in
the challenge of economic
growth in the future; Landes-
mann (2003) provides some evi-
dence on changing skills.
Some other areas of public
spending also face major needs
for reorientation and restructur-
ing. Transport industries, for
example railways and utilities,
are such areas. Cost-benefit
analyses of transport infrastruc-
ture investments would be
important, as there can be a ten-
dency to favour new big projects
such as new motorways at the
expense of road maintenance and improvement that
may in fact yield higher rates of return. Improve-
ment also appears possible in the social services sec-
tor, which appears to have too much manpower.
Here improvements in the productivity and efficien-
cy of health care are a significant issue given that
health care is a major item of social spending. The
modernization of social services and education can
also lead to demands for increased wages, which can
create another pressure on public finances unless
reductions in manpower are carried out in conjunc-
tion with reforms in these sectors.
4. Labour markets and social policies
4.1 Employment and unemployment
Figure 5.4 indicates that there are wide disparities in
the unemployment rates among the entrants. For
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   Table 5.5
Fiscal effects of EU membership
(medium-term annual effects on the fiscal balance of entering countries)
% of GDP
Direct effects
Contributions to EU budget -1.0 to –1.2
EU structural operations -0.9 to +1.3
Infrastructure expenditure ?
Admin. reform and acquis implementation +/- 0
Realignment of customs duties +0.2 to -0.5
Tax harmonization +0.5
Phase-out of production subsidies +0.2 to 2
Indirect effects
Positive growth effects 0 to +1
Structural reforms + (minor)
Tax competition - (minor)
Reduced risk premia + (anticipated)
    Source: Backe (2002).
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some countries unemployment is, in fact, lower than
the EU-15 average,whereas other entering countries
have quite high unemployment.The 2003 unemploy-
ment rates range from the high 20 percent for Poland
to the low figure of 4.2 percent in Cyprus.
The relatively high unemployment rates indicate that
there is potential for higher output in the accession
countries. Employment rates in the accession coun-
tries are relatively high, though there is quite a lot of
variation among countries. Growth of employment in
the new member countries has been fluctuating and it
has not been very high on average. Hungary and
Slovenia are to some extent exceptions.
Labour markets in both the entering and the EU-15
countries are likely to face major challenges as a
result of the 2004 EU enlargement even if transition
periods will make the effects more gradual than
would an immediate liberalization. Box 5.1 outlines
the transition agreements.
The movement of labour and capital among coun-
tries can enhance economic efficiency when it cor-
responds to comparative advantages of the different
economies. These efficiency gains may not be real-
ized if the functioning of labour and product mar-
kets in EU-15 and entering countries is not suffi-
ciently smooth.14 In any case, the efficiency gains
will take a long time to realise and different sectors
may well experience different patterns and speeds
of adjustment. Some results suggest that conver-
gence takes place mostly in services whereas tradi-
tional manufacturing will experience only very slow
change;see Stehrer et al.(1999).If possible gains do
not accrue equally to different parts of the labour
force, political and social opposition to these
impacts of the 2004 enlargement can be induced.
14 The establishment of NAFTA, especially the increased prosperi-
ty of the US-Mexican border areas, indicates that increased inte-
gration need not lead to unemployment and other adverse effects
when the labour markets are flexible; see e.g. Hanson (2001).
 Table 5.6
Employment rate in accession countries
(employment in percent of population, 15 to 65 years)












  Source: Eurostat (2003d), German Statistical Office
  (2003).
Box 5.1
Transition periods in labour mobility and social policies
The enlargement treaties give individual countries a possibility to introduce transition periods during which
mobility of people from the new member countries to Western EU countries can be limited. Each country can
decide whether it adopts the transition arrangements. The general rules for transition periods are:
Free movement of people
The following measures apply to all acceding countries except Cyprus and Malta.
• During a period of two years, national policies will be applied by current members to new member states;
they may result in full labour market access depending on how liberal the measures are.
• Before the end of the second year after accession an automatic review by the Commission will be held and
upon request by a new member state a further one. The decision whether to apply the acquis is left to the
current member state.
• After five years the transitional arrangement should in principle end; nevertheless it may be extended by
two more years in the member states in case of serious labour market disruptions.
• Up to the end of the seventh year safeguards may be applied by member states.
Austria and Germany are allowed to apply specific national measures in certain critical service sectors. There
is also a safeguard clause for Malta.
EU-15 countries are currently deciding on the application of the transition periods. Austria, Finland, France
and Germany have decided to adopt them, while Sweden has not yet made a decision. Some other countries,
including the UK, that are not bordering the entrants, have decided against transition periods.
Further information: European Commission: Report on the results of negotiations on the accession of Cyprus,
Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to
the European Union.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/negotiations_report_to_ep.pdfThe wage determination process
is also likely to change with
tighter product market integra-
tion, leading to some wage mod-
eration in the current EU coun-
tries and possibly higher average
levels of employment.
The 2004 enlargement will affect
the structure of labour demand
as well as industrial location in
both current and new member
countries. Low-skilled manufac-
turing jobs and industry will
probably relocate to some extent
to the accession countries. In
addition, there will be both low
and high-skill labour migration
from the accession countries to
the current members.
Both developments will incur substantial difficulties
for a number of the existing EU countries, and they
will challenge the flexibility of their political systems.
Currently, the wages of low-skilled workers are
rather high in the West,as they are supported,among
other things, by high replacement incomes provided
by the welfare state. If these replacement incomes
remain as high as they are, the speed at which man-
ufacturing industries in the West will have to give
way may be excessive, and the risk that too few jobs
in the service sectors will be created will be substan-
tial. Unemployment could increase.To prevent such
a development, it is desirable that the West
European welfare states overhaul their welfare sys-
tems to allow for the necessary flexibility of wages
for low-skilled workers.15
4.2 Income inequality
Table 5.7 presents data on income inequality (mea-
sured by the Gini coefficient).16 Two characteristics
stand out. First, overall the degree of income inequal-
ity in the entering countries is similar to that in the
EU-15 countries.Second,there is significant variation
in inequality among countries.Among the new mem-
ber states, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia have the
most egalitarian income distributions.
Following the well-known Kuznetz Curve hypothe-
sis, it is often suggested that over time income
inequality follows a hump-shaped curve, so that it
initially tends to increase and then decrease as
countries grow rich.17 If this hypothesis is true,
some increase in income inequality in the new
member states is likely to occur.This is all the more
probable in the Eastern European and Baltic coun-
tries, as trade unions there are weak and collective
bargaining is of limited importance and takes place
at the firm level if it occurs. However, at this stage
of development this increase in income inequality
may be beneficial for employment growth in these
countries.
4.3 Migration of labour to EU-15 countries
It has been estimated that opening of borders as a
result of the enlargement will lead to increased
migration of labour from the new member states to
the EU-15 countries.This migration process is likely
to have very differential impacts on different EU-15
countries, with countries close to new member
states, like Austria and Germany receiving the
biggest impacts. Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Greece and Sweden may also be affected to a sig-
nificant degree. It is anticipated that the time pat-
tern of the migration of labour will be hump-shaped
with increasing magnitudes in the early years due to




17 See Aghion and Williamson (1998) for a discussion and critique
of the Kuznetz curve hypothesis.
15 In our first report, EEAG (2002), we designed a system of
employment tax credits as activating social aid that provides for
such flexibility and that allows the western countries to capture the
potential gains from trade in an enlarged Europe.
16 See for example Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, 232–237) for a
definition and discussion of the Gini coefficient and other related
measures of inequality.
 Table 5.7
Gini coefficients for EU and acceding countries
Country Survey year Gini coefficient















Notes: a. Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population,  b. Rank-
ed by per capita expenditure,  c. Refers to income shares by percentiles of
population, d. Ranked by per capita income, e: The EU average is calculated
as a weighted average of national results (where each country receives a
weight that equals its total population).
  Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2002; Eurostat (2003b)
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According to the estimates provided by the
European Commission (2001a), the cumulative
migration potential in the five-year period 2005 to
2009 could amount to 1.2 percent of the population
in the acceding countries and 0.35 percent of the
working population in the EU-15 countries. These
estimates are based on the study by Boeri and
Brücker (2000), but that study filters out the cross
country information on economic migration stimuli
and infers its long-run migration estimates from
observing migrants’ previous responses to business
cycle variations.18Another study by Sinn et al.(2001)
comes up with higher estimates for the migration
potential in the order of 4 to 5 percent of the popu-
lation in the acceding countries over a period of
15 years,which corresponds to a migration of rough-
ly 1.5 to 2 percent of the population of the acceding
countries within the first five years.19 Whatever the
true migration potential, actual migration will, in all
likelihood, be smaller than these estimates of migra-
tion potentials simply because the EU has already
envisaged administrative constraints on the possible
number of migrants (see Box 5.1).There is no study
we know of that dares to predict the volume of
migration under these constraints.
The structure of migration is an additional issue even
if it is difficult to obtain quantitative estimates of it.
A first distinction is between short-term and perma-
nent migration.It is anticipated that there will be sig-
nificant temporary migration – even commuting –
into EU-15 countries bordering some of the new
member states. Cross-border provision of services is
likely to increase as a result of free mobility of
labour once any transition restrictions are abolished.
A second distinction concerns the skill level of the
migrants. The old impression that migrants move
from relatively high positions may be true, but in
many cases the jobs taken in the receiving countries
will have a lower qualification level than the jobs the
migrants left behind. Using different studies, the
European Commission (2001a) quotes the estimate
that 12 to 14 percent of westbound migration after
1989 has been highly skilled, comprising managers,
scientists and students. If these estimates are of any
guidance about the future, it seems that the new
member countries will face some brain drain.20
The migration scenarios just discussed can perhaps
be summarized as indicating that the 2004 enlarge-
ment will induce a non-trivial amount of labour
migration, which will lead to downward pressures
and possible unemployment of blue-collar manufac-
turing workers and of unskilled labour in services in
the EU-15 countries. Moreover, it is likely that a rel-
atively high proportion of the migration from the
new member countries will go to Germany and some
other countries that are geographically close to the
entrants. Thus far, two thirds of east European
migrants into the EU have moved to Germany, and
one third has spread over all other EU countries.21
Unemployment in the latter countries can increase
as a result of the migration, which will put pressure
on their welfare systems.
Referring to experiences from the 1980s’ EU
Southern enlargement, which did not lead to very
large migration flows,Boeri et al.(2002) suggest that,
while migration after the 2004 enlargement will be
significant, the impact on the labour markets of the
EU-15 countries will nevertheless be fairly moder-
ate.One should note,however,that Eastern enlarge-
ment differs substantially from Southern enlarge-
ment. First, while Portuguese and Spanish wages
averaged about one half of west German wages at
the time of accession, the average wage of the
Eastern countries is about one sixth of German
wages, both measured at going exchange rates.
Second, while the Iron Curtain and subsequent legal
migration constraints by Western EU countries have
prevented mass migration before accession, the
Iberian countries had experienced mass emigration
before accession. From 1960 to 1974, the time when
the Iberian dictatorships ended, and EU member-
ship was applied for (1975), net cumulated emigra-
tion from Portugal and Spain had been 5.5 percent of
the joint population of these countries despite a
simultaneous re-migration from overseas territories.
This crucial difference should not be overlooked
when forecasts about migration from Eastern
Europe are made.
4.4 Social policies towards labour
As was already noted, the functioning of the EU-15
labour markets is a key issue in dealing with the
labour market impacts of the 2004 enlargement. It is
often argued that, in the EU-15 countries, labour
markets are relatively rigid due to fairly high levels
18 See Sinn and Werding (2001).
19 Sinn et al. (2001).
20 According to the EEAG (2003, Ch. 5), the issue of a brain drain
from Western Europe to North America is currently a concern. A
similar brain drain to Western Europe can become a concern for
the new member states. 21 See Ochel (2001).of employment protection. Measures to increase
labour mobility and wage flexibility would facilitate
the adjustments that are needed in EU-15 countries
in response to the 2004 enlargement.The major pol-
icy objective will be the enhancement of labour
mobility between different sectors and types of jobs
in the economy.
The challenges will be partly different for the new
member states. They are in general likely to benefit
from enhanced economic opportunities and faster
economic growth. However, the question of labour
mobility is also a concern for the new member states
since their economies are likely to face major struc-
tural change as a result of EU membership.The cur-
rent high unemployment in several accession coun-
tries suggests that labour markets in these countries
are not functioning well even though wages are
determined in a decentralized manner.
Labour market policies that increase employment
protection reduce labour mobility; see Chapters 2
and 3 and also Chapter 6 in EEAG (2002).Similarly,
mobility can be decreased by social replacement
income schemes. Such schemes play a valuable role
in providing insurance against adversity, in particu-
lar the incidence of unemployment, but the design
of these schemes implies a trade-off between the
insurance rationale and the negative effects on
labour mobility.The EU-15 and the accession coun-
tries face very different pressures as regards these
labour market policies. The former will need to re-
structure employment protection arrangements. In
contrast,the latter countries will probably face pres-
sures to introduce some policies of employment
protection, at least when these countries grow rich-
er and begin to build up their welfare states.
Premature introduction of labour market policies
can be dangerous for the accession countries as it
can slow down the required labour mobility and
structural change.22
Different measures of labour market regulation for
income protection are to an extent substitutable: a
lower level of employment protection could be com-
pensated by more generous temporary unemploy-
ment insurance and in-work benefits. Retraining
schemes and better incentives for life-long learning
to educate people in the middle of their working life
are another set of measures that improve labour
mobility.These kinds of measures will be important
in the current EU-15 countries since the low-skilled
workers are likely to be hit hardest by the 2004
enlargement even if transition periods will
smoothen the effect of labour competition from the
entering countries. Chapters 2 and 3 in this report
provide more complete discussions of appropriate
policies to enhance the functioning of EU labour
markets.
Other social policies to mitigate labour market and
regional effects of enlargement will rely on more
general transfers and other measures.These will be
politically important since the impacts of the 2004
enlargement on different sectors and regions will
differ a great deal. On the one hand, some regions
and sectors in EU-15 will receive aid to combat
economic decline. On the other hand, there will be
pressures to provide aid to the poorest regions in
the entering countries. Redistribution schemes
between regions and countries are going to be the
subject of debate as a result of the enlargement.23
Building up social safety nets will probably be a
policy concern in the new member countries. An
important consideration for safety nets is the cre-
ation of a system of “welfare to work” in order to
increase employment in the entering countries
(see Chapter 6 of EEAG 2002 for a further discus-
sion of welfare to work). The proposal relies on a
system of employment tax credits to enhance work
incentives.
It is often suggested that the EU structural funds
play an important role in facilitating the growth
and convergence processes that were discussed in
Section 3 above.The efficiency of the EU structur-
al programme has been questioned in a number of
studies; see the discussion in Boeri et al. (2002).
The empirical findings have given rise to a fair
amount of controversy, which suggests that the
structural funding programme must be implement-
ed with great care.24 Some measures are likely to
be beneficial, while the effect of others is more
questionable. Education is perhaps the clearest
example of where EU-level aid can be helpful in
promoting growth and thereby in mitigating social
problems. Other items such as infrastructure
investment can also be useful at least in cases




22 See Sinn and Ochel (2003).
23 See Ingham et al. (2002) for an overview of regional policies and
further discussion.
24 The empirical assessment of such programmes is subject to a
number of econometric issues that have not been fully solved; see
de la Fuente (2000).EEAG Report 109
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5. Capital mobility and selected sector issues 
Data on the current accounts of the new member
countries are presented in Figure 5.5. Evidently, cur-
rent accounts are in deficit in the new member coun-
tries.This is not surprising,given that these countries
are amidst a catching-up process with Western
Europe. Domestic savings have not been sufficient
to finance the relatively high levels of investment
required for rapid economic growth. The saving-
investment gap has necessitated the financing of
investment by foreign funds and,as will be discussed
below, there has already been quite significant FDI
into the entering countries during the transition
process in the 1990s.
Current account deficits in the accession countries
are a symptom of both large financing needs for
enhancing economic growth as well as possible prob-
lems in domestic financial intermediation. Current
account deficits can be sustainable if economic
growth takes place at a rapid rate. However, if
growth starts to slow, then deficit countries become
vulnerable to capital inflows, which could trigger
exchange rate instabilities and macroeconomic fluc-
tuations. This is discussed at length in Chapter 6.
Countering such instabilities would require flexibili-
ty in macroeconomic policies, and countries with
large public deficits would need to rely on monetary
and exchange rate policies.
5.1 Capital movements
Besides international trade, capital movements are
another major element of the benefits from
European integration. Capital movements are a
potentially important source of growth for new
member countries. In general, the 2004 enlargement
is likely to reduce industry risk premia for FDI into
the entering countries, which is likely to promote
FDI. Direct investment in Eastern Europe has
already taken place on a large scale.25 As was men-
tioned above, firms from the old member countries
have already moved labour intensive parts of their
intermediate product chains to Eastern Europe.The
process is particularly pronounced in west Germany
where even many the small and medium-sized firms
have sought to preserve their competitiveness by
shifting activities to Eastern Europe and other parts
of the world.
FDI involves the establishment
of new plants as well as acquisi-
tions of existing firms in the
entering countries.26 Data on
FDI into the new member coun-
tries are presented in Table 5.8.
A notable feature of capital
flows is that they, at least for
Central Eastern European and
Baltic countries, predominantly
take the form of private FDI. In




Foreign direct investments in accession countries












Notes: For Malta the average is calculated for the
period until 2001; figures used for 2002 (also 2001 for
the Slovak Republic and 2002 and 2001 for Cyprus)
are provisional.
   Source: Regular Reports 2002 and 2003;
http://europa.eu/enlargement/report2002/;
http://europa.eu/enlargement/report2003/;
25 See Sinn (2003).
26 The studies in Alessandrini (2000) pro-
vide further details on FDI from EU-15
into Central and Eastern Europe.apparently a key factor behind the FDI flows.
However, the connection between privatization and
FDI has become much less pronounced in recent
years, which suggests that mergers and acquisitions
might be playing an increasing role in FDI inflows;
see European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (2003) for further discussion. Capital
outflows from the accession countries are currently
very limited,but there is some potential for increase,
which might be of some importance to those EU-15
countries that border on the new member countries.
With the exception of Slovenia, the entering coun-
tries have largely liberalized their capital movements
in advance of integration into the EU. There have
been significant differences among the entrants in
the timing of the liberalization; see Buch (1999). For
example,Estonia liberalized capital account transac-
tions as early as 1994.In general,it is difficult to sep-
arate the impact of EU membership from the effects
of “announcements” and from liberalization mea-
sures that have been taking place ahead of actual
membership.
Buch (1999) considers the correlation between
national savings and investment and finds that,in the
period 1991 to 1997, the degree of capital mobility
for several of the Central Eastern European coun-
tries is of a similar order of magnitude to those of
Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and
Spain).27 Moreover,looking at time series,it appears
that EU membership of the Southern European
countries had differing effects on capital mobility.
There were significant positive effects on capital
inflows to Portugal and Spain,whereas the change in
capital inflows to Greece was much less pronounced
(with even a decline relative to GDP).Breuss (2001)
estimated that, with full EU membership, FDI into
Central Eastern European countries could increase
by up to 1.5 percentage points of GDP per year.
5.2 Industrial change
After the downfall of socialism in the early 1990s,
Central Eastern European countries came increas-
ingly to operate under the practices and rules of
market economies. In the latter, industrial structures
and their changes are largely the outcome patterns
of relative competitiveness among different sectors
in a country and,for sectors with tradable goods,also
of the relative competitiveness of each sector in dif-
ferent countries.The performance of the “open”sec-
tors, whose products are tradable internationally,
depends critically on relative cost and price struc-
tures among countries.The cost and price structures
are in turn determined by aspects of both compara-
tive advantage in international trade as well as by
possible scale economies and firm linkages.
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) suggest that reduc-
tions in trade costs with deepening EU integration
have the potential of explaining industry location
and industry structures in the EU. When the new
members join the EU Single Market, the forces of
comparative advantage, scale economies and firm
linkages will also become increasingly important for
them. Using a global computable general equilibri-
um model with trade costs and scale economies,
Forslid et al.(2002) suggest that many industrial sec-
tors with scale economies will be relatively concen-
trated in specific areas when international integra-
tion lowers trade costs. The agglomeration effects
would seem to work in favour of both the present
EU countries and the entering Central Eastern
European countries. However, Forslid et al. (2002)
also find that the relationship between trade costs
and industrial concentration is not monotonic and
forces of comparative advantage become relatively
more important when other trade costs approach
zero. Effects of comparative advantage in interna-
tional trade do not favour any particular country or
region, and the agglomeration effects are weakened
as a high degree of integration with small trade costs
is attained.The more symmetrical effects of compar-
ative advantage would, in relative terms, favour
countries in northern and southern parts of the
enlarged EU. In total, it is difficult to make unam-
biguous predictions about future developments
here.28
The transition away from socialism led to major
structural changes in industries of the Central and
Eastern European countries. Many of these coun-
tries inherited,in terms of relative employment,very
big industrial sectors, which were pronouncedly
biased towards heavy base industry. The early years
of transition led to both absolute and relative
declines of manufacturing in these countries. In
some of these countries, the second half of the 1990s
saw a partial recovery as a result of restructuring,
EEAG Report 110
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28 The structure of the Forslid et al. (2002) model does not yield
very specific predictions for industries and welfare in the new
member states and incumbent countries after the enlargement.
27 The correlation of national saving and investment as a measure
of lack of capital mobility was initially suggested by Feldstein and
Horioka (1980).EEAG Report 111
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privatization and FDI. Table 5.9 shows, within each
country, changes in productivity among different
industrial sectors for the period 1995 to 2001 in the
entering Central Eastern European countries. It can
be seen that different countries have experienced


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.changes.29 The electrical and optical equipment
industry has been a big gainer in several countries,
notably in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and
Lithuania. The transport equipment industry has
been another industry that is becoming more com-
petitive in terms of productivity. In Estonia produc-
tivity improvement in the wood industry also stands
out. On the other hand, food products, textiles and
leather industries have been relative losers in terms
of productivity, though there are some variations
between countries. Productivity changes are one key
factor behind changes in competitiveness. In addi-
tion, changes in labour costs are important.
Table 5.10 shows the relative changes in unit labour
costs among different domestic sectors for the
Central Eastern European entering countries.
Certain specific industries, such as electrical and
optical equipment and transport equipment, have
made gains in cost competitiveness in the entering
countries (excluding Cyprus and Malta).
Relative competitiveness in domestic terms is not the
only determinant of the overall competitiveness of
sectors with tradable products. Changes in overall
competitiveness vis-à-vis other changes are not
straightforward to measure, though indicators such as
sector trade balances for different countries can be
used to suggest patterns of competitiveness.
Examining sector trade balances, Havlik (2003) sug-
gests that the gains in competitiveness vary a good
deal among the entering countries.It appears that tex-
tiles, wood and wood products and other (non-classi-
fied) manufacturing have fairly generally been gain-
ers in competitiveness in the period 1995 to 2001. For
individual countries and sectors
some clear results also emerge:
Big gainers are (i) the electrical
and optical equipment industry
in Hungary and Estonia, (ii)
transport equipment in the
Czech Republic and Hungary,
and (iii) coal, refined chemicals
and nuclear fuel in Hungary
and the Baltic countries.
The results from the indicators
suggest that there will be sig-
nificant diversity in the pat-
terns of industries and their
catching-up and growth processes in the entering
Central and Eastern European countries. This con-
clusion broadly accords with studies that consider
sector dynamics using models of catching-up in
terms of productivity and product quality; see e.g.
Stehrer et al. (1999) and Landesmann (2003). The
diversity is likely to translate into fairly persistent
differences in wages and living standards among
countries and among regions within countries.
5.3 Agriculture
In order to assess the effects of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) on the new member states, we
start with some basic facts about their agricultural
systems.These are summarised in the following table:
In terms of total cultivated area, Poland is the most
important country, followed by Hungary and the
Czech Republic. If measured in terms of civilians
employed in agriculture, Poland is also the country
with the highest agricultural share, but by this mea-
sure agriculture is also quite important for Latvia
and Lithuania. The agricultural sector contributes
about 2 to 4 percent of GDP. The GDP shares of
agriculture are much lower than its employment
shares, which suggest that labour productivity in
agriculture is quite low and there is scope for signif-
icant improvement. Agricultural and food trade
between EU-15 and the entering countries increased
significantly already during the transition process in
the 1990s.30 All of the entering Eastern European
EEAG Report 112
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29 See Havlik (2003) for an overview
of industrial change in Central
Eastern European countries.
 Table 5.11
Key agricultural data for accession countries – 2001
Employment in
agriculture.






in food and agricultural
products (million EUR)
CC-10 13.2 3.1 - 2,281
Czech Republic 4.9 1.7 -709
Estonia 7.1 3.2 -347
Cyprus 4.9 3.9 -556
Latvia 15.1 3.0 -361
Lithuania 16.5 3.1 -56
Hungary 6.1 3.8 1,486
Malta 2.1 2.2 -265
Poland 19.2 3.1 -604
Slovenia 9.9 2.0 -363
Slovak Republic 6.3 1.9 -506
   Source: European Commission, Eurostat and Directorate General for Agriculture,
Agricultural statistics; http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2002/table_en/2012.pdf
30 See Lukas and Pöschl (2003) for a more detailed discussion.EEAG Report 113
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countries except Hungary exhibit trade deficits in
food and agricultural products.
The data show that agriculture is of major political
and social concern to the entering countries.
Reforming their agricultural sectors as well as the
integration into the EU Common Agricultural Policy
will be an important task for the years to come.
Agriculture is also an important policy concern as it
is a huge item in the EU budget (see Section 3
above).
Considering the economic aspects, it can be noted
that for the EU-15 economies and also for EU-25 as
a whole the effects of the enlargement stemming
from agriculture on the aggregate economies will be
fairly limited. This is because the role of agriculture
in GDP is relatively small even if agriculture is an
important policy concern. Interestingly, the role of
agriculture in the Southern European countries was
of similar magnitude upon their entry in the EU in
the 1980’s.The southern countries provide a point of
comparison for developments in agriculture: The
share of agriculture in GDP and employment
decreased gradually after the entry of the southern
countries into the EU.
What are the likely effects of the 2004 enlargement
for agriculture and food industries in the entering
countries? The abolishment of tariffs and other pro-
tective measures will no doubt lead to increased
trade between EU-15 and the entering countries that
have major agricultural and food processing sec-
tors.31This should increase agricultural production in
several new member countries. There are, however,
some factors that will limit this tendency. Quota
restrictions will limit increases in agricultural output
and EU regulations on food quality and safety also
have a restrictive effect. The latter are imposed on
the new member countries from the beginning of
EU membership. The tight regulations will make
some of the food industry firms in the entering coun-
tries non-competitive, but the regulations are also
likely to lead to improvements in food quality in the
longer term.More generally,the future of agriculture
and the food industry in the entering countries will
significantly depend on how CAP develops in the
coming years. Future changes in CAP are in turn
heavily dependent on what happens to agriculture in
the WTO global trade negotiations.
There will be some transition periods in the adoption
of CAP by the new member countries.These imply a
gradual percentage increase in the EU support in the
form of direct payments and other schemes. The
development of productivity in agriculture and food
processing is clearly an important issue for agricul-
ture.There appears to be much scope for narrowing
the productivity gap in agriculture between the EU-
15 and the entering countries. For example, small
farms still dominate agriculture in Poland. For the
record, it can be noted that the agricultural produc-
tivity gap between the southern European countries
and the other EU countries did not close very rapid-
ly; see European Commission (2001a).
The structural changes in agriculture in the entering
countries imply a significant movement of labour
from agriculture to other sectors and possibly also
to other countries. This movement was already in
progress in the 1990s, as employment in agriculture
was falling; see European Commission (2001a) and
Ingham and Ingham (2002b) for details. The move-
ment of labour away from agriculture can be a
major source of immigrants from the accession
countries to EU-15 member states. It appears, how-
ever,that the across-the-border migration flows due
to the structural change in agriculture are likely to
be limited since much of the “released” labour will
be relatively aged and low-skilled. Thus this move-
ment is more likely to be towards other domestic
sectors and retirement.
6. Conclusions
The 2004 EU enlargement will most likely yield
major benefits to the new member countries in the
long run.The new members will be able to capture
gains from trade in goods and services and will
moreover benefit from a continued inflow of
financial and real capital. In fact, the capital inflow
is already very substantial as revealed by the cur-
rent account deficits in the order of 4 to 6 percent
for the major countries. Most of the capital flows
are in the form of direct investment by present EU
member countries,largely driven by the attempt to
profit from currently very low wages. Many firms
in the existing member countries outsourced
labour-intensive parts of their intermediate prod-
uct chain to Eastern Europe already in the pre-
accession stage and this development is likely to
gain further momentum after the formal accession.
Without doubt, these processes will significantly
31 Currently, the accession countries (excluding Cyprus and Malta)
tend to have high import tariffs for agriculture and food processing
but hardly any export tariffs.In contrast,EU-15 has both tariffs;see
Lejour et al. (2001).accelerate the economic growth of Eastern
Europe. However, even under optimistic assump-
tions, catching-up with the EU-15 countries will be
a time-consuming process that will take several
decades in most cases.
In principle, the existing EU member countries will
also participate in the gains from trade.However,the
internal adjustment processes necessary for such an
outcome may involve significant costs and frictions.
In particular, it will be difficult to administer the
wage cuts for the low-skilled that are necessary to
prevent a further increase in unemployment and an
excessive dismantling of labour intensive produc-
tion. EEAG (2002) suggested a system of employ-
ment tax credits as a way of activating social assis-
tance that would generate the necessary wage flexi-
bility without reducing the living standards of the
poor. Moreover, in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report,
we point to reforms of labour market institutions
that would also enhance wage flexibility.As regards
pay-setting practices, such reforms should entail
measures to promote relative-wage flexibility among
sectors, regions and occupations.
The economic consequences of EU entry will also
depend on the policies adopted by the new member
countries themselves. The entering countries cur-
rently have fairly fragile macroeconomic situations.
Many of them have significant public sector deficits
even if the levels of public debt are low or moder-
ate. Sustainability of public finances can become a
major policy concern for several of the new mem-
ber countries.
Significant transfers from the EU notwithstanding,
the new members will face pressures on public
spending after enlargement.The countries will have
to co-finance EU-funded projects, and implementa-
tion of EU regulations will entail fiscal costs. Im-
provement of the infrastructure,including reforms of
the social sector and education, will be another
major item in the public spending of several new
member countries. Some other fiscal costs and sav-
ings coming from EU membership contributions and
alignment with EU customs and taxes will also have
to be met. In total, the fiscal effects are not straight-
forward and there can be small gains or losses for the
different new members.
Many of the accession countries have high unem-
ployment, so that there are significant underutilized
resources. At best this can provide further impetus
for rapid economic growth.The same characteristics
represent major labour migration potential from the
new members to EU-15 countries.This pressure will
be particularly strongly felt in countries such as
Germany and Austria that are geographically close
to the new members.
EU membership and fully open borders will gradu-
ally lead to changes in industrial structure as well.
The 1990s decline of manufacturing in the Baltic and
Central European accession countries has been
reversed in most recent years. Some manufacturing
sectors have seen a recovery, and it is probable that
this will continue in the future. Significant amounts
of fairly low-skill manufacturing industry and ser-
vices may gradually shift from EU-15 to new mem-
ber countries.
Agricultural productivity is evidently quite low in
the new member states with significant potential
for improvement. This can lead to increased agri-
cultural and food production in some of these
countries, though food safety and CAP regulations
imply limitations in this respect. The future of
international WTO negotiations will also play an
important role for the development of agriculture
and the food processing industry in the new mem-
ber countries.
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Financial framework for enlargement 2004-2006
Indicative allocation of Commitment appropriations
in % of total Commission budget for 2004
Total 10 Acc. Countr. EU-15 EU-25
1. Agriculture 3.3 38.3 41.6
2. Structural Actions 7.5 26.8 34.3
3. Internal Policies 1.5 5.9 7.4
4. External Actions 4.2 4.2
5. Administration 0.6 4.5 5.1
6. Reserves 0.4 0.4
7. Pre-Accession Aid 2.8 2.8
8. Compensation 1.2 1.2
Total Appropriations
for Commitments
(Heading 1, 2 and 3) 14.1 82.9 97
   Source: EU.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/perspfin/tbl20002006eur15_en.pdf.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/ip03217/ip03217_en.pdf.
   http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf.
   http://www.europarl.eu.int/committees/budg/budg2003/preparation_inter_en.htm
   Calculations by the EEAG.